remove duplicated code
This commit is contained in:
redmatrix
parent
aa5b7eb98a
commit
2d799f2c11
@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ class Receiver {
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$this->messagetype = $this->data['type'];
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}
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if(! $this->messagetype)
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$error = true;
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$this->error = true;
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$this->sender = ((array_key_exists('sender',$this->data)) ? $this->data['sender'] : null);
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$this->recipients = ((array_key_exists('recipients',$this->data)) ? $this->data['recipients'] : null);
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477
mod/post.php
477
mod/post.php
@ -481,6 +481,8 @@ function post_init(&$a) {
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*
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* @param[in,out] App &$a
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*/
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function post_post(&$a) {
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require_once('Zotlabs/Zot/Receiver.php');
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@ -489,479 +491,6 @@ function post_post(&$a) {
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// notreached;
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exit;
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exit;
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$encrypted_packet = false;
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$ret = array('success' => false);
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$data = json_decode($_REQUEST['data'],true);
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/*
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* Many message packets will arrive encrypted. The existence of an 'iv'
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* element tells us we need to unencapsulate the AES-256-CBC content using
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* the site private key.
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*/
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if($data && array_key_exists('iv',$data)) {
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$encrypted_packet = true;
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$data = crypto_unencapsulate($data,get_config('system','prvkey'));
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logger('mod_zot: decrypt1: ' . $data, LOGGER_DATA);
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$data = json_decode($data,true);
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}
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if(! $data) {
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// possible Bleichenbacher's attack, just treat it as a
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// message we have no handler for. It should fail a bit
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// further along with "no hub". Our public key is public
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// knowledge. There's no reason why anybody should get the
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// encryption wrong unless they're fishing or hacking. If
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// they're developing and made a goof, this can be discovered
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// in the logs of the destination site. If they're fishing or
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// hacking, the bottom line is we can't verify their hub.
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// That's all we're going to tell them.
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$data = array('type' => 'bogus');
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}
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$msgtype = ((array_key_exists('type',$data)) ? $data['type'] : '');
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if($msgtype === 'ping') {
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// Useful to get a health check on a remote site.
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// This will let us know if any important communication details
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// that we may have stored are no longer valid, regardless of xchan details.
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logger('POST: got ping send pong now back: ' . z_root() , LOGGER_DEBUG );
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$ret['success'] = true;
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$ret['site'] = array();
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$ret['site']['url'] = z_root();
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$ret['site']['url_sig'] = base64url_encode(rsa_sign(z_root(),get_config('system','prvkey')));
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$ret['site']['sitekey'] = get_config('system','pubkey');
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json_return_and_die($ret);
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}
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if($msgtype === 'pickup') {
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/*
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* The 'pickup' message arrives with a tracking ID which is associated with a particular outq_hash
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* First verify that that the returned signatures verify, then check that we have an outbound queue item
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* with the correct hash.
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* If everything verifies, find any/all outbound messages in the queue for this hubloc and send them back
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*/
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if((! $data['secret']) || (! $data['secret_sig'])) {
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$ret['message'] = 'no verification signature';
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logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message'], LOGGER_DEBUG);
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json_return_and_die($ret);
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}
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$r = q("select distinct hubloc_sitekey from hubloc where hubloc_url = '%s' and hubloc_callback = '%s' and hubloc_sitekey != '' group by hubloc_sitekey ",
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dbesc($data['url']),
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dbesc($data['callback'])
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);
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if(! $r) {
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$ret['message'] = 'site not found';
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logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message']);
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json_return_and_die($ret);
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}
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foreach ($r as $hubsite) {
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// verify the url_sig
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// If the server was re-installed at some point, there could be multiple hubs with the same url and callback.
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// Only one will have a valid key.
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$forgery = true;
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$secret_fail = true;
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$sitekey = $hubsite['hubloc_sitekey'];
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logger('mod_zot: Checking sitekey: ' . $sitekey, LOGGER_DATA);
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if(rsa_verify($data['callback'],base64url_decode($data['callback_sig']),$sitekey)) {
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$forgery = false;
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}
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if(rsa_verify($data['secret'],base64url_decode($data['secret_sig']),$sitekey)) {
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$secret_fail = false;
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}
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if((! $forgery) && (! $secret_fail))
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break;
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}
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if($forgery) {
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$ret['message'] = 'possible site forgery';
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logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message']);
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json_return_and_die($ret);
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}
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if($secret_fail) {
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$ret['message'] = 'secret validation failed';
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logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message']);
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json_return_and_die($ret);
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}
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/*
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* If we made it to here, the signatures verify, but we still don't know if the tracking ID is valid.
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* It wouldn't be an error if the tracking ID isn't found, because we may have sent this particular
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* queue item with another pickup (after the tracking ID for the other pickup was verified).
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*/
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$r = q("select outq_posturl from outq where outq_hash = '%s' and outq_posturl = '%s' limit 1",
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dbesc($data['secret']),
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dbesc($data['callback'])
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);
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if(! $r) {
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$ret['message'] = 'nothing to pick up';
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logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message']);
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json_return_and_die($ret);
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}
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/*
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* Everything is good if we made it here, so find all messages that are going to this location
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* and send them all.
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*/
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$r = q("select * from outq where outq_posturl = '%s'",
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dbesc($data['callback'])
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);
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if($r) {
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logger('mod_zot: successful pickup message received from ' . $data['callback'] . ' ' . count($r) . ' message(s) picked up', LOGGER_DEBUG);
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$ret['success'] = true;
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$ret['pickup'] = array();
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foreach($r as $rr) {
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if($rr['outq_msg']) {
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$x = json_decode($rr['outq_msg'],true);
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if(! $x)
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continue;
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if(array_key_exists('message_list',$x)) {
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foreach($x['message_list'] as $xx) {
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$ret['pickup'][] = array('notify' => json_decode($rr['outq_notify'],true),'message' => $xx);
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}
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}
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else
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$ret['pickup'][] = array('notify' => json_decode($rr['outq_notify'],true),'message' => $x);
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$x = q("delete from outq where outq_hash = '%s'",
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dbesc($rr['outq_hash'])
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);
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}
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}
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}
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$encrypted = crypto_encapsulate(json_encode($ret),$sitekey);
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json_return_and_die($encrypted);
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/* pickup: end */
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}
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/*
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* All other message types require us to verify the sender. This is a generic check, so we
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* will do it once here and bail if anything goes wrong.
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*/
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if (array_key_exists('sender',$data)) {
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$sender = $data['sender'];
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}
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/* Check if the sender is already verified here */
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$hubs = zot_gethub($sender,true);
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if (! $hubs) {
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/* Have never seen this guid or this guid coming from this location. Check it and register it. */
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// (!!) this will validate the sender
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$result = zot_register_hub($sender);
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if ((! $result['success']) || (! ($hubs = zot_gethub($sender,true)))) {
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$ret['message'] = 'Hub not available.';
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logger('mod_zot: no hub');
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json_return_and_die($ret);
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}
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}
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foreach($hubs as $hub) {
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$sitekey = $hub['hubloc_sitekey'];
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if(array_key_exists('sitekey',$sender) && $sender['sitekey']) {
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/*
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* This hub has now been proven to be valid.
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* Any hub with the same URL and a different sitekey cannot be valid.
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* Get rid of them (mark them deleted). There's a good chance they were re-installs.
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*/
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q("update hubloc set hubloc_deleted = 1, hubloc_error = 1 where hubloc_url = '%s' and hubloc_sitekey != '%s' ",
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dbesc($hub['hubloc_url']),
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dbesc($sender['sitekey'])
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);
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$sitekey = $sender['sitekey'];
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}
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// $sender['sitekey'] is a new addition to the protcol to distinguish
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// hublocs coming from re-installed sites. Older sites will not provide
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// this field and we have to still mark them valid, since we can't tell
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// if this hubloc has the same sitekey as the packet we received.
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// Update our DB to show when we last communicated successfully with this hub
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// This will allow us to prune dead hubs from using up resources
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$r = q("update hubloc set hubloc_connected = '%s' where hubloc_id = %d and hubloc_sitekey = '%s' ",
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dbesc(datetime_convert()),
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intval($hub['hubloc_id']),
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dbesc($sitekey)
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);
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// a dead hub came back to life - reset any tombstones we might have
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if(intval($hub['hubloc_error'])) {
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q("update hubloc set hubloc_error = 0 where hubloc_id = %d and hubloc_sitekey = '%s' ",
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intval($hub['hubloc_id']),
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dbesc($sitekey)
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);
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if(intval($r[0]['hubloc_orphancheck'])) {
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q("update hubloc set hubloc_orhpancheck = 0 where hubloc_id = %d and hubloc_sitekey = '%s' ",
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intval($hub['hubloc_id']),
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dbesc($sitekey)
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);
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}
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q("update xchan set xchan_orphan = 0 where xchan_orphan = 1 and xchan_hash = '%s'",
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dbesc($hub['hubloc_hash'])
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);
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}
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$connecting_url = $hub['hubloc_url'];
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}
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/** @TODO check which hub is primary and take action if mismatched */
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if (array_key_exists('recipients', $data))
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$recipients = $data['recipients'];
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if ($msgtype === 'auth_check') {
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/*
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* Requestor visits /magic/?dest=somewhere on their own site with a browser
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* magic redirects them to $destsite/post [with auth args....]
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* $destsite sends an auth_check packet to originator site
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* The auth_check packet is handled here by the originator's site
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* - the browser session is still waiting
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* inside $destsite/post for everything to verify
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* If everything checks out we'll return a token to $destsite
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* and then $destsite will verify the token, authenticate the browser
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* session and then redirect to the original destination.
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* If authentication fails, the redirection to the original destination
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* will still take place but without authentication.
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*/
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logger('mod_zot: auth_check', LOGGER_DEBUG);
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if (! $encrypted_packet) {
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logger('mod_zot: auth_check packet was not encrypted.');
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$ret['message'] .= 'no packet encryption' . EOL;
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json_return_and_die($ret);
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}
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$arr = $data['sender'];
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$sender_hash = make_xchan_hash($arr['guid'],$arr['guid_sig']);
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// garbage collect any old unused notifications
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// This was and should be 10 minutes but my hosting provider has time lag between the DB and
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// the web server. We should probably convert this to webserver time rather than DB time so
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// that the different clocks won't affect it and allow us to keep the time short.
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q("delete from verify where type = 'auth' and created < %s - INTERVAL %s",
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db_utcnow(), db_quoteinterval('30 MINUTE')
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);
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$y = q("select xchan_pubkey from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s' limit 1",
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dbesc($sender_hash)
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);
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// We created a unique hash in mod/magic.php when we invoked remote auth, and stored it in
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// the verify table. It is now coming back to us as 'secret' and is signed by a channel at the other end.
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// First verify their signature. We will have obtained a zot-info packet from them as part of the sender
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// verification.
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if ((! $y) || (! rsa_verify($data['secret'], base64url_decode($data['secret_sig']),$y[0]['xchan_pubkey']))) {
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logger('mod_zot: auth_check: sender not found or secret_sig invalid.');
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$ret['message'] .= 'sender not found or sig invalid ' . print_r($y,true) . EOL;
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json_return_and_die($ret);
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}
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// There should be exactly one recipient, the original auth requestor
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$ret['message'] .= 'recipients ' . print_r($recipients,true) . EOL;
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if ($data['recipients']) {
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$arr = $data['recipients'][0];
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$recip_hash = make_xchan_hash($arr['guid'], $arr['guid_sig']);
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$c = q("select channel_id, channel_account_id, channel_prvkey from channel where channel_hash = '%s' limit 1",
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dbesc($recip_hash)
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);
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if (! $c) {
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logger('mod_zot: auth_check: recipient channel not found.');
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$ret['message'] .= 'recipient not found.' . EOL;
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json_return_and_die($ret);
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}
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$confirm = base64url_encode(rsa_sign($data['secret'] . $recip_hash,$c[0]['channel_prvkey']));
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// This additionally checks for forged sites since we already stored the expected result in meta
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// and we've already verified that this is them via zot_gethub() and that their key signed our token
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$z = q("select id from verify where channel = %d and type = 'auth' and token = '%s' and meta = '%s' limit 1",
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intval($c[0]['channel_id']),
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dbesc($data['secret']),
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dbesc($data['sender']['url'])
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);
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if (! $z) {
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logger('mod_zot: auth_check: verification key not found.');
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$ret['message'] .= 'verification key not found' . EOL;
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json_return_and_die($ret);
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}
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$r = q("delete from verify where id = %d",
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intval($z[0]['id'])
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);
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$u = q("select account_service_class from account where account_id = %d limit 1",
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intval($c[0]['channel_account_id'])
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);
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logger('mod_zot: auth_check: success', LOGGER_DEBUG);
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$ret['success'] = true;
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$ret['confirm'] = $confirm;
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if ($u && $u[0]['account_service_class'])
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$ret['service_class'] = $u[0]['account_service_class'];
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// Set "do not track" flag if this site or this channel's profile is restricted
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// in some way
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if (intval(get_config('system','block_public')))
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$ret['DNT'] = true;
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if (! perm_is_allowed($c[0]['channel_id'],'','view_profile'))
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$ret['DNT'] = true;
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if (get_pconfig($c[0]['channel_id'],'system','do_not_track'))
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$ret['DNT'] = true;
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if (get_pconfig($c[0]['channel_id'],'system','hide_online_status'))
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$ret['DNT'] = true;
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json_return_and_die($ret);
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}
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json_return_and_die($ret);
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}
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if ($msgtype === 'request') {
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// request a particular post/conversation by message_id
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$x = zot_process_message_request($data);
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json_return_and_die($x);
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}
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if ($msgtype === 'purge') {
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if ($recipients) {
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// basically this means "unfriend"
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foreach ($recipients as $recip) {
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$r = q("select channel.*,xchan.* from channel
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left join xchan on channel_hash = xchan_hash
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where channel_guid = '%s' and channel_guid_sig = '%s' limit 1",
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dbesc($recip['guid']),
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dbesc($recip['guid_sig'])
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);
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if ($r) {
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$r = q("select abook_id from abook where uid = %d and abook_xchan = '%s' limit 1",
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intval($r[0]['channel_id']),
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dbesc(make_xchan_hash($sender['guid'],$sender['guid_sig']))
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);
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if ($r) {
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contact_remove($r[0]['channel_id'],$r[0]['abook_id']);
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}
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}
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}
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} else {
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// Unfriend everybody - basically this means the channel has committed suicide
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$arr = $data['sender'];
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$sender_hash = make_xchan_hash($arr['guid'],$arr['guid_sig']);
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require_once('include/Contact.php');
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remove_all_xchan_resources($sender_hash);
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$ret['success'] = true;
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json_return_and_die($ret);
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}
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}
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if (($msgtype === 'refresh') || ($msgtype === 'force_refresh')) {
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// remote channel info (such as permissions or photo or something)
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// has been updated. Grab a fresh copy and sync it.
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// The difference between refresh and force_refresh is that
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// force_refresh unconditionally creates a directory update record,
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// even if no changes were detected upon processing.
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if ($recipients) {
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// This would be a permissions update, typically for one connection
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foreach ($recipients as $recip) {
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$r = q("select channel.*,xchan.* from channel
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left join xchan on channel_hash = xchan_hash
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where channel_guid = '%s' and channel_guid_sig = '%s' limit 1",
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dbesc($recip['guid']),
|
||||
dbesc($recip['guid_sig'])
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
$x = zot_refresh(array(
|
||||
'xchan_guid' => $sender['guid'],
|
||||
'xchan_guid_sig' => $sender['guid_sig'],
|
||||
'hubloc_url' => $sender['url']
|
||||
), $r[0], (($msgtype === 'force_refresh') ? true : false));
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
|
||||
// system wide refresh
|
||||
|
||||
$x = zot_refresh(array(
|
||||
'xchan_guid' => $sender['guid'],
|
||||
'xchan_guid_sig' => $sender['guid_sig'],
|
||||
'hubloc_url' => $sender['url']
|
||||
), null, (($msgtype === 'force_refresh') ? true : false));
|
||||
}
|
||||
$ret['success'] = true;
|
||||
json_return_and_die($ret);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if ($msgtype === 'notify') {
|
||||
|
||||
logger('notify received from ' . $connecting_url);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
$async = get_config('system','queued_fetch');
|
||||
|
||||
if ($async) {
|
||||
// add to receive queue
|
||||
// qreceive_add($data);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
$x = zot_fetch($data);
|
||||
$ret['delivery_report'] = $x;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
$ret['success'] = true;
|
||||
json_return_and_die($ret);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// catchall
|
||||
json_return_and_die($ret);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user