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Merge branch 'dev' of https://gitlab.com/macgirvin/hubzilla into dev

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This commit is contained in:
Mike Macgirvin 2019-03-13 10:40:23 +11:00
commit 0026849821
3 changed files with 240 additions and 89 deletions
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80
Zotlabs/Module/Item.php
View File

@ -40,57 +40,78 @@ class Item extends Controller {
function init() {
if(Libzot::is_zot_request()) {
if (Libzot::is_zot_request()) {
$conversation = false;
$item_id = argv(1);
if(! $item_id)
if (! $item_id)
http_status_exit(404, 'Not found');
$portable_id = EMPTY_STR;
$item_normal = " and item.item_hidden = 0 and item.item_type = 0 and item.item_unpublished = 0 and item.item_delayed = 0 and item.item_blocked = 0 ";
$i = null;
// do we have the item (at all)?
$r = q("select * from item where mid = '%s' $item_normal limit 1",
dbesc(z_root() . '/item/' . $item_id)
);
if (! $r) {
http_status_exit(404,'Not found');
}
// process an authenticated fetch
$sigdata = HTTPSig::verify(EMPTY_STR);
if($sigdata['portable_id'] && $sigdata['header_valid']) {
$portable_id = $sigdata['portable_id'];
observer_auth($portable_id);
// first see if we have a copy of this item's parent owned by the current signer
// include xchans for all zot-like networks - these will have the same guid and public key
$x = q("select * from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s'",
dbesc($sigdata['portable_id'])
);
if ($x) {
$xchans = q("select xchan_hash from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s' OR ( xchan_guid = '%s' AND xchan_pubkey = '%s' ) ",
dbesc($sigdata['portable_id']),
dbesc($x[0]['xchan_guid']),
dbesc($x[0]['xchan_pubkey'])
);
if ($xchans) {
$hashes = ids_to_querystr($xchans,'xchan_hash',true);
$i = q("select id as item_id from item where mid = '%s' $item_normal and owner_xchan in ( " . protect_sprintf($hashes) . " ) ",
dbesc($r[0]['parent_mid'])
);
}
}
}
$item_normal = " and item.item_hidden = 0 and item.item_type = 0 and item.item_unpublished = 0 and item.item_delayed = 0 and item.item_blocked = 0 ";
// if we don't have a parent id belonging to the signer see if we can obtain one as a visitor that we have permission to access
$sql_extra = item_permissions_sql(0);
$r = q("select * from item where mid = '%s' $item_normal $sql_extra limit 1",
dbesc(z_root() . '/item/' . $item_id)
);
if(! $r) {
$r = q("select * from item where mid = '%s' $item_normal limit 1",
dbesc(z_root() . '/item/' . $item_id)
if (! $i) {
$i = q("select id as item_id from item where mid = '%s' $item_normal $sql_extra limit 1",
dbesc($r[0]['parent_mid'])
);
if($r) {
http_status_exit(403, 'Forbidden');
}
http_status_exit(404, 'Not found');
}
$items = q("select parent as item_id from item where mid = '%s' and uid = %d $item_normal $sql_extra ",
dbesc($r[0]['parent_mid']),
intval($r[0]['uid'])
);
if(! $items) {
http_status_exit(404, 'Not found');
if(! $i) {
http_status_exit(403,'Forbidden');
}
$r = $items;
$parents_str = ids_to_querystr($r,'item_id');
$parents_str = ids_to_querystr($i,'item_id');
$items = q("SELECT item.*, item.id AS item_id FROM item WHERE item.parent IN ( %s ) $item_normal $sql_extra ",
$items = q("SELECT item.*, item.id AS item_id FROM item WHERE item.parent IN ( %s ) $item_normal ",
dbesc($parents_str)
);
@ -98,9 +119,8 @@ class Item extends Controller {
http_status_exit(404, 'Not found');
}
$r = $items;
xchan_query($r,true);
$items = fetch_post_tags($r,true);
xchan_query($items,true);
$items = fetch_post_tags($items,true);
$observer = App::get_observer();
$parent = $items[0];

1
include/items.php
View File

@ -918,6 +918,7 @@ function import_author_xchan($x) {
if($x['url']) {
$y = discover_by_webbie($x['url'],'zot6');
if($y) {
return $y;
}

248
include/security.php
View File

@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ function change_channel($change_channel) {
*
* @return string additional SQL where statement
*/
function permissions_sql($owner_id, $remote_observer = null, $table = '') {
$local_channel = local_channel();
@ -316,7 +317,7 @@ function permissions_sql($owner_id, $remote_observer = null, $table = '') {
* default permissions - anonymous user
*/
if($table)
if ($table)
$table .= '.';
$sql = " AND {$table}allow_cid = ''
@ -329,38 +330,63 @@ function permissions_sql($owner_id, $remote_observer = null, $table = '') {
* Profile owner - everything is visible
*/
if(($local_channel) && ($local_channel == $owner_id)) {
$sql = '';
if (($local_channel) && ($local_channel == $owner_id)) {
return EMPTY_STR;
}
/**
* Authenticated visitor. Unless pre-verified,
* check that the contact belongs to this $owner_id
* and load the groups the visitor belongs to.
* If pre-verified, the caller is expected to have already
* done this and passed the groups into this function.
* Authenticated visitor.
*/
else {
$observer = ((! is_null($remote_observer)) ? $remote_observer : get_observer_hash());
if($observer) {
$groups = init_groups_visitor($observer);
$gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
if ($observer) {
if(is_array($groups) && count($groups)) {
foreach($groups as $g)
$gs .= '|<' . $g . '>';
$sec = get_security_ids($owner_id,$observer);
// always allow the channel owner, even if authenticated as a visitor
if ($sec['channel_id']) {
foreach ($sec['channel_id'] as $ch) {
if ($observer === $ch) {
return EMPTY_STR;
}
}
}
if (is_array($sec['allow_cid']) && count($sec['allow_cid'])) {
$ca = [];
foreach ($sec['allow_cid'] as $c) {
$ca[] = '<' . $c . '>';
}
$cs = implode('|',$ca);
}
else {
$cs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
}
if (is_array($sec['allow_gid']) && count($sec['allow_gid'])) {
$ga = [];
foreach ($sec['allow_gid'] as $g) {
$ga[] = '<' . $g . '>';
}
$gs = implode('|',$ga);
}
else {
$gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
}
$regexop = db_getfunc('REGEXP');
$sql = sprintf(
" AND ( NOT ({$table}deny_cid like '%s' OR {$table}deny_gid $regexop '%s')
AND ( {$table}allow_cid like '%s' OR {$table}allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( {$table}allow_cid = '' AND {$table}allow_gid = '') )
" AND ( NOT ({$table}deny_cid $regexop '%s' OR {$table}deny_gid $regexop '%s')
AND ( {$table}allow_cid $regexop '%s' OR {$table}allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( {$table}allow_cid = '' AND {$table}allow_gid = '') )
)
",
dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer . '>%')),
dbesc($cs),
dbesc($gs),
dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer . '>%')),
dbesc($cs),
dbesc($gs)
);
}
@ -377,6 +403,7 @@ function permissions_sql($owner_id, $remote_observer = null, $table = '') {
*
* @return string additional SQL where statement
*/
function item_permissions_sql($owner_id, $remote_observer = null) {
$local_channel = local_channel();
@ -398,37 +425,59 @@ function item_permissions_sql($owner_id, $remote_observer = null) {
}
/**
* Authenticated visitor. Unless pre-verified,
* check that the contact belongs to this $owner_id
* and load the groups the visitor belongs to.
* If pre-verified, the caller is expected to have already
* done this and passed the groups into this function.
* Authenticated visitor.
*/
else {
$observer = (($remote_observer) ? $remote_observer : get_observer_hash());
if($observer) {
$observer = (($remote_observer) ? $remote_observer : get_observer_hash());
$s = scopes_sql($owner_id,$observer);
if($observer) {
$groups = init_groups_visitor($observer);
$scope = scopes_sql($owner_id,$observer);
$sec = get_security_ids($owner_id,$observer);
$gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
// always allow the channel owner, even if authenticated as a visitor
if(is_array($groups) && count($groups)) {
foreach($groups as $g)
$gs .= '|<' . $g . '>';
if($sec['channel_id']) {
foreach($sec['channel_id'] as $ch) {
if($observer === $ch) {
return EMPTY_STR;
}
}
}
if (is_array($sec['allow_cid']) && count($sec['allow_cid'])) {
$ca = [];
foreach ($sec['allow_cid'] as $c) {
$ca[] = '<' . $c . '>';
}
$cs = implode('|',$ca);
}
else {
$cs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
}
if (is_array($sec['allow_gid']) && count($sec['allow_gid'])) {
$ga = [];
foreach ($sec['allow_gid'] as $g) {
$ga[] = '<' . $g . '>';
}
$gs = implode('|',$ga);
}
else {
$gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
}
$regexop = db_getfunc('REGEXP');
$sql = sprintf(
" AND (( NOT (deny_cid like '%s' OR deny_gid $regexop '%s')
AND ( allow_cid like '%s' OR allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '' AND item_private = 0 ))
) OR ( item_private = 1 $s ))
" AND (( NOT (deny_cid $regexop '%s' OR deny_gid $regexop '%s')
AND ( allow_cid $regexop '%s' OR allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '' AND item_private = 0 ))
) OR ( item_private = 1 $scope ))
",
dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer . '>%')),
dbesc($cs),
dbesc($gs),
dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer . '>%')),
dbesc($cs),
dbesc($gs)
);
}
@ -465,40 +514,57 @@ function scopes_sql($uid,$observer) {
}
/**
* @param string $observer_hash
*
* @return string additional SQL where statement
*/
function public_permissions_sql($observer_hash) {
$groups = init_groups_visitor($observer_hash);
$owner_id = 0;
$gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
if ($observer_hash) {
$sec = get_security_ids($owner_id,$observer_hash);
if (is_array($sec['allow_cid']) && count($sec['allow_cid'])) {
$ca = [];
foreach ($sec['allow_cid'] as $c) {
$ca[] = '<' . $c . '>';
}
$cs = implode('|',$ca);
}
else {
$cs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
}
if (is_array($sec['allow_gid']) && count($sec['allow_gid'])) {
$ga = [];
foreach ($sec['allow_gid'] as $g) {
$ga[] = '<' . $g . '>';
}
$gs = implode('|',$ga);
}
else {
$gs = '<<>>'; // should be impossible to match
}
if(is_array($groups) && count($groups)) {
foreach($groups as $g)
$gs .= '|<' . $g . '>';
}
$sql = '';
if($observer_hash) {
$regexop = db_getfunc('REGEXP');
$sql = sprintf(
" OR (( NOT (deny_cid like '%s' OR deny_gid $regexop '%s')
AND ( allow_cid like '%s' OR allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '' AND item_private = 0 ) )
))
" AND ( NOT (deny_cid $regexop '%s' OR deny_gid $regexop '%s')
AND ( allow_cid $regexop '%s' OR allow_gid $regexop '%s' OR ( allow_cid = '' AND allow_gid = '' AND item_private = 0) )
)
",
dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer_hash . '>%')),
dbesc($cs),
dbesc($gs),
dbesc(protect_sprintf( '%<' . $observer_hash . '>%')),
dbesc($cs),
dbesc($gs)
);
}
else {
$sql = EMPTY_STR;
}
return $sql;
}
@ -510,7 +576,7 @@ function public_permissions_sql($observer_hash) {
* In this implementation, a security token is reusable (if the user submits a form, goes back and resubmits the form, maybe with small changes;
* or if the security token is used for ajax-calls that happen several times), but only valid for a certain amout of time (3hours).
* The "typename" seperates the security tokens of different types of forms. This could be relevant in the following case:
* A security token is used to protekt a link from CSRF (e.g. the "delete this profile"-link).
* A security token is used to protect a link from CSRF (e.g. the "delete this profile"-link).
* If the new page contains by any chance external elements, then the used security token is exposed by the referrer.
* Actually, important actions should not be triggered by Links / GET-Requests at all, but somethimes they still are,
* so this mechanism brings in some damage control (the attacker would be able to forge a request to a form of this type, but not to forms of other types).
@ -587,8 +653,8 @@ function init_groups_visitor($contact_id) {
// private profiles are treated as a virtual group
$r = q("SELECT abook_profile from abook where abook_xchan in ( " . protect_sprintf($hashes) . " ) and abook_profile != '' ");
if($r) {
foreach($r as $rv) {
if ($r) {
foreach ($r as $rv) {
$groups[] = 'vp.' . $rv['abook_profile'];
}
}
@ -596,8 +662,8 @@ function init_groups_visitor($contact_id) {
// physical groups this identity is a member of
$r = q("SELECT hash FROM pgrp left join pgrp_member on pgrp.id = pgrp_member.gid WHERE xchan in ( " . protect_sprintf($hashes) . " ) ");
if($r) {
foreach($r as $rr)
if ($r) {
foreach ($r as $rr)
$groups[] = $rr['hash'];
}
return $groups;
@ -605,6 +671,70 @@ function init_groups_visitor($contact_id) {
function get_security_ids($channel_id, $ob_hash) {
$ret = [
'channel_id' => [],
'allow_cid' => [],
'allow_gid' => []
];
if($channel_id) {
$ch = q("select channel_hash, channel_portable_id from channel where channel_id = %d",
intval($channel_id)
);
if($ch) {
$ret['channel_id'][] = $ch[0]['channel_hash'];
$ret['channel_id'][] = $ch[0]['channel_portable_id'];
}
}
$groups = [];
$x = q("select * from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s'",
dbesc($ob_hash)
);
if ($x) {
// include xchans for all zot-like networks
$xchans = q("select xchan_hash from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s' OR ( xchan_guid = '%s' AND xchan_pubkey = '%s' ) ",
dbesc($ob_hash),
dbesc($x[0]['xchan_guid']),
dbesc($x[0]['xchan_pubkey'])
);
if ($xchans) {
$ret['allow_cid'] = ids_to_array($xchans,'xchan_hash');
$hashes = ids_to_querystr($xchans,'xchan_hash',true);
// private profiles are treated as a virtual group
$r = q("SELECT abook_profile from abook where abook_xchan in ( " . protect_sprintf($hashes) . " ) and abook_profile != '' ");
if($r) {
foreach ($r as $rv) {
$groups[] = 'vp.' . $rv['abook_profile'];
}
}
// physical groups this identity is a member of
$r = q("SELECT hash FROM pgrp left join pgrp_member on pgrp.id = pgrp_member.gid WHERE xchan in ( " . protect_sprintf($hashes) . " ) ");
if($r) {
foreach ($r as $rv) {
$groups[] = $rv['hash'];
}
}
$ret['allow_gid'] = $groups;
}
}
return $ret;
}
// This is used to determine which uid have posts which are visible to the logged in user (from the API) for the
// public_timeline, and we can use this in a community page by making
// $perms = (PERMS_NETWORK|PERMS_PUBLIC) unless logged in.