948 lines
32 KiB
PHP
948 lines
32 KiB
PHP
<?php
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/**
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* @file mod/post.php
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*
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* @brief Zot endpoint.
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*
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*/
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require_once('include/zot.php');
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/**
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* @brief HTTP POST entry point for Zot.
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*
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* Most access to this endpoint is via the post method.
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* Here we will pick out the magic auth params which arrive as a get request,
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* and the only communications to arrive this way.
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*
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* Magic Auth
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* ==========
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*
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* So-called "magic auth" takes place by a special exchange. On the site where the "channel to be authenticated" lives (e.g. $mysite),
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* a redirection is made via $mysite/magic to the zot endpoint of the remote site ($remotesite) with special GET parameters.
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*
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* The endpoint is typically https://$remotesite/post - or whatever was specified as the callback url in prior communications
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* (we will bootstrap an address and fetch a zot info packet if possible where no prior communications exist)
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*
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* Five GET parameters are supplied:
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* * auth => the urlencoded webbie (channel@host.domain) of the channel requesting access
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* * dest => the desired destination URL (urlencoded)
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* * sec => a random string which is also stored on $mysite for use during the verification phase.
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* * version => the zot revision
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* * delegate => optional urlencoded webbie of a local channel to invoke delegation rights for
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*
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* When this packet is received, an "auth-check" zot message is sent to $mysite.
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* (e.g. if $_GET['auth'] is foobar@podunk.edu, a zot packet is sent to the podunk.edu zot endpoint, which is typically /post)
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* If no information has been recorded about the requesting identity a zot information packet will be retrieved before
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* continuing.
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*
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* The sender of this packet is an arbitrary/random site channel. The recipients will be a single recipient corresponding
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* to the guid and guid_sig we have associated with the requesting auth identity
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*
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* \code{.json}
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* {
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* "type":"auth_check",
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* "sender":{
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* "guid":"kgVFf_...",
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* "guid_sig":"PT9-TApz...",
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* "url":"http:\/\/podunk.edu",
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* "url_sig":"T8Bp7j..."
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* },
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* "recipients":{
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* {
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* "guid":"ZHSqb...",
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* "guid_sig":"JsAAXi..."
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* }
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* }
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* "callback":"\/post",
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* "version":1,
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* "secret":"1eaa661",
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* "secret_sig":"eKV968b1..."
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* }
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* \endcode
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*
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* auth_check messages MUST use encapsulated encryption. This message is sent to the origination site, which checks the 'secret' to see
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* if it is the same as the 'sec' which it passed originally. It also checks the secret_sig which is the secret signed by the
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* destination channel's private key and base64url encoded. If everything checks out, a json packet is returned:
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*
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* \code{.json}
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* {
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* "success":1,
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* "confirm":"q0Ysovd1u...",
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* "service_class":(optional)
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* "level":(optional)
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* }
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* \endcode
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*
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* 'confirm' in this case is the base64url encoded RSA signature of the concatenation of 'secret' with the
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* base64url encoded whirlpool hash of the requestor's guid and guid_sig; signed with the source channel private key.
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* This prevents a man-in-the-middle from inserting a rogue success packet. Upon receipt and successful
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* verification of this packet, the destination site will redirect to the original destination URL and indicate a successful remote login.
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* Service_class can be used by cooperating sites to provide different access rights based on account rights and subscription plans. It is
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* a string whose contents are not defined by protocol. Example: "basic" or "gold".
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*
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* @param[in,out] App &$a
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*/
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function post_init(&$a) {
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if (array_key_exists('auth', $_REQUEST)) {
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$ret = array('success' => false, 'message' => '');
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logger('mod_zot: auth request received.');
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$address = $_REQUEST['auth'];
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$desturl = $_REQUEST['dest'];
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$sec = $_REQUEST['sec'];
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$version = $_REQUEST['version'];
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$delegate = $_REQUEST['delegate'];
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$test = ((x($_REQUEST, 'test')) ? intval($_REQUEST['test']) : 0);
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// They are authenticating ultimately to the site and not to a particular channel.
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// Any channel will do, providing it's currently active. We just need to have an
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// identity to attach to the packet we send back. So find one.
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$c = q("select * from channel where not ( channel_pageflags & %d )>0 limit 1",
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intval(PAGE_REMOVED)
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);
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if (! $c) {
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// nobody here
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logger('mod_zot: auth: unable to find a response channel');
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if ($test) {
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$ret['message'] .= 'no local channels found.' . EOL;
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json_return_and_die($ret);
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}
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goaway($desturl);
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}
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// Try and find a hubloc for the person attempting to auth
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$x = q("select * from hubloc left join xchan on xchan_hash = hubloc_hash where hubloc_addr = '%s' order by hubloc_id desc limit 1",
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dbesc($address)
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);
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if (! $x) {
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// finger them if they can't be found.
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$ret = zot_finger($address, null);
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if ($ret['success']) {
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$j = json_decode($ret['body'], true);
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if ($j)
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import_xchan($j);
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$x = q("select * from hubloc left join xchan on xchan_hash = hubloc_hash where hubloc_addr = '%s' order by hubloc_id desc limit 1",
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dbesc($address)
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);
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}
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}
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if(! $x) {
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logger('mod_zot: auth: unable to finger ' . $address);
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if($test) {
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$ret['message'] .= 'no hubloc found for ' . $address . ' and probing failed.' . EOL;
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json_return_and_die($ret);
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}
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goaway($desturl);
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}
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logger('mod_zot: auth request received from ' . $x[0]['hubloc_addr'] );
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// check credentials and access
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// If they are already authenticated and haven't changed credentials,
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// we can save an expensive network round trip and improve performance.
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$remote = remote_channel();
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$result = null;
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$remote_service_class = '';
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$remote_level = 0;
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$remote_hub = $x[0]['hubloc_url'];
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$DNT = 0;
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// Also check that they are coming from the same site as they authenticated with originally.
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$already_authed = ((($remote) && ($x[0]['hubloc_hash'] == $remote) && ($x[0]['hubloc_url'] === $_SESSION['remote_hub'])) ? true : false);
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if($delegate && $delegate !== $_SESSION['delegate_channel'])
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$already_authed = false;
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$j = array();
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if (! $already_authed) {
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// Auth packets MUST use ultra top-secret hush-hush mode - e.g. the entire packet is encrypted using the site private key
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// The actual channel sending the packet ($c[0]) is not important, but this provides a generic zot packet with a sender
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// which can be verified
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$p = zot_build_packet($c[0],$type = 'auth_check', array(array('guid' => $x[0]['hubloc_guid'],'guid_sig' => $x[0]['hubloc_guid_sig'])), $x[0]['hubloc_sitekey'], $sec);
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if ($test) {
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$ret['message'] .= 'auth check packet created using sitekey ' . $x[0]['hubloc_sitekey'] . EOL;
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$ret['message'] .= 'packet contents: ' . $p . EOL;
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}
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$result = zot_zot($x[0]['hubloc_callback'],$p);
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if (! $result['success']) {
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logger('mod_zot: auth_check callback failed.');
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if ($test) {
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$ret['message'] .= 'auth check request to your site returned .' . print_r($result, true) . EOL;
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json_return_and_die($ret);
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}
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goaway($desturl);
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}
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$j = json_decode($result['body'], true);
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if (! $j) {
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logger('mod_zot: auth_check json data malformed.');
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if($test) {
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$ret['message'] .= 'json malformed: ' . $result['body'] . EOL;
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json_return_and_die($ret);
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}
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}
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}
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if ($test) {
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$ret['message'] .= 'auth check request returned .' . print_r($j, true) . EOL;
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}
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if ($already_authed || $j['success']) {
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if ($j['success']) {
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// legit response, but we do need to check that this wasn't answered by a man-in-middle
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if (! rsa_verify($sec . $x[0]['xchan_hash'],base64url_decode($j['confirm']),$x[0]['xchan_pubkey'])) {
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logger('mod_zot: auth: final confirmation failed.');
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if ($test) {
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$ret['message'] .= 'final confirmation failed. ' . $sec . print_r($j,true) . print_r($x[0],true);
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json_return_and_die($ret);
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}
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goaway($desturl);
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}
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if (array_key_exists('service_class',$j))
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$remote_service_class = $j['service_class'];
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if (array_key_exists('level',$j))
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$remote_level = $j['level'];
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if (array_key_exists('DNT',$j))
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$DNT = $j['DNT'];
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}
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// everything is good... maybe
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if(local_channel()) {
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// tell them to logout if they're logged in locally as anything but the target remote account
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// in which case just shut up because they don't need to be doing this at all.
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if ($a->channel['channel_hash'] != $x[0]['xchan_hash']) {
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logger('mod_zot: auth: already authenticated locally as somebody else.');
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notice( t('Remote authentication blocked. You are logged into this site locally. Please logout and retry.') . EOL);
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if ($test) {
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$ret['message'] .= 'already logged in locally with a conflicting identity.' . EOL;
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json_return_and_die($ret);
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}
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}
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goaway($desturl);
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}
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// log them in
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if ($test) {
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$ret['success'] = true;
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$ret['message'] .= 'Authentication Success!' . EOL;
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json_return_and_die($ret);
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}
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$delegation_success = false;
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if ($delegate) {
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$r = q("select * from channel left join xchan on channel_hash = xchan_hash where xchan_addr = '%s' limit 1",
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dbesc($delegate)
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);
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if ($r && intval($r[0]['channel_id'])) {
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$allowed = perm_is_allowed($r[0]['channel_id'],$x[0]['xchan_hash'],'delegate');
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if ($allowed) {
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$_SESSION['delegate_channel'] = $r[0]['channel_id'];
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$_SESSION['delegate'] = $x[0]['xchan_hash'];
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$_SESSION['account_id'] = intval($r[0]['channel_account_id']);
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require_once('include/security.php');
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change_channel($r[0]['channel_id']);
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$delegation_success = true;
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}
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}
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}
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$_SESSION['authenticated'] = 1;
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if (! $delegation_success) {
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$_SESSION['visitor_id'] = $x[0]['xchan_hash'];
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$_SESSION['my_url'] = $x[0]['xchan_url'];
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$_SESSION['my_address'] = $address;
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$_SESSION['remote_service_class'] = $remote_service_class;
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$_SESSION['remote_level'] = $remote_level;
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$_SESSION['remote_hub'] = $remote_hub;
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$_SESSION['DNT'] = $DNT;
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}
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$arr = array('xchan' => $x[0], 'url' => $desturl, 'session' => $_SESSION);
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call_hooks('magic_auth_success',$arr);
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$a->set_observer($x[0]);
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require_once('include/security.php');
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$a->set_groups(init_groups_visitor($_SESSION['visitor_id']));
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info(sprintf( t('Welcome %s. Remote authentication successful.'),$x[0]['xchan_name']));
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logger('mod_zot: auth success from ' . $x[0]['xchan_addr']);
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q("update hubloc set hubloc_status = (hubloc_status | %d ) where hubloc_id = %d ",
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intval(HUBLOC_WORKS),
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intval($x[0]['hubloc_id'])
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);
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} else {
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if ($test) {
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$ret['message'] .= 'auth failure. ' . print_r($_REQUEST,true) . print_r($j,true) . EOL;
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json_return_and_die($ret);
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}
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logger('mod_zot: magic-auth failure - not authenticated: ' . $x[0]['xchan_addr']);
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q("update hubloc set hubloc_status = (hubloc_status | %d ) where hubloc_id = %d ",
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intval(HUBLOC_RECEIVE_ERROR),
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intval($x[0]['hubloc_id'])
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);
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}
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/**
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* @FIXME we really want to save the return_url in the session before we
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* visit rmagic. This does however prevent a recursion if you visit
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* rmagic directly, as it would otherwise send you back here again.
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* But z_root() probably isn't where you really want to go.
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*/
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if ($test) {
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$ret['message'] .= 'auth failure fallthrough ' . print_r($_REQUEST,true) . print_r($j,true) . EOL;
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json_return_and_die($ret);
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}
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if(strstr($desturl,z_root() . '/rmagic'))
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goaway(z_root());
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goaway($desturl);
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}
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}
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/**
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* @brief zot communications and messaging.
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*
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* Sender HTTP posts to this endpoint ($site/post typically) with 'data' parameter set to json zot message packet.
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* This packet is optionally encrypted, which we will discover if the json has an 'iv' element.
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* $contents => array( 'alg' => 'aes256cbc', 'iv' => initialisation vector, 'key' => decryption key, 'data' => encrypted data);
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* $contents->iv and $contents->key are random strings encrypted with this site's RSA public key and then base64url encoded.
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* Currently only 'aes256cbc' is used, but this is extensible should that algorithm prove inadequate.
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*
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* Once decrypted, one will find the normal json_encoded zot message packet.
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*
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* Defined packet types are: notify, purge, refresh, force_refresh, auth_check, ping, and pickup
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*
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* Standard packet: (used by notify, purge, refresh, force_refresh, and auth_check)
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* \code{.json}
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* {
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* "type": "notify",
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* "sender":{
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* "guid":"kgVFf_1...",
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* "guid_sig":"PT9-TApzp...",
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* "url":"http:\/\/podunk.edu",
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* "url_sig":"T8Bp7j5...",
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* },
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* "recipients": { optional recipient array },
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* "callback":"\/post",
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* "version":1,
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* "secret":"1eaa...",
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* "secret_sig": "df89025470fac8..."
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* }
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* \endcode
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*
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* Signature fields are all signed with the sender channel private key and base64url encoded.
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* Recipients are arrays of guid and guid_sig, which were previously signed with the recipients private
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* key and base64url encoded and later obtained via channel discovery. Absence of recipients indicates
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* a public message or visible to all potential listeners on this site.
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*
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* "pickup" packet:
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* The pickup packet is sent in response to a notify packet from another site
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* \code{.json}
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* {
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* "type":"pickup",
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* "url":"http:\/\/example.com",
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* "callback":"http:\/\/example.com\/post",
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* "callback_sig":"teE1_fLI...",
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* "secret":"1eaa...",
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* "secret_sig":"O7nB4_..."
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* }
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* \endcode
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*
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* In the pickup packet, the sig fields correspond to the respective data
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* element signed with this site's system private key and then base64url encoded.
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* The "secret" is the same as the original secret from the notify packet.
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*
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* If verification is successful, a json structure is returned containing a
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* success indicator and an array of type 'pickup'.
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* Each pickup element contains the original notify request and a message field
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* whose contents are dependent on the message type.
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*
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* This JSON array is AES encapsulated using the site public key of the site
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* that sent the initial zot pickup packet.
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* Using the above example, this would be example.com.
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*
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* \code{.json}
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* {
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* "success":1,
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* "pickup":{
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* "notify":{
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* "type":"notify",
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* "sender":{
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* "guid":"kgVFf_...",
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* "guid_sig":"PT9-TApz...",
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* "url":"http:\/\/z.podunk.edu",
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* "url_sig":"T8Bp7j5D..."
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* },
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* "callback":"\/post",
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* "version":1,
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* "secret":"1eaa661..."
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* },
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* "message":{
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* "type":"activity",
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* "message_id":"10b049ce384cbb2da9467319bc98169ab36290b8bbb403aa0c0accd9cb072e76@podunk.edu",
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* "message_top":"10b049ce384cbb2da9467319bc98169ab36290b8bbb403aa0c0accd9cb072e76@podunk.edu",
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* "message_parent":"10b049ce384cbb2da9467319bc98169ab36290b8bbb403aa0c0accd9cb072e76@podunk.edu",
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* "created":"2012-11-20 04:04:16",
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* "edited":"2012-11-20 04:04:16",
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* "title":"",
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* "body":"Hi Nickordo",
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* "app":"",
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* "verb":"post",
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* "object_type":"",
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* "target_type":"",
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* "permalink":"",
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* "location":"",
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* "longlat":"",
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* "owner":{
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* "name":"Indigo",
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* "address":"indigo@podunk.edu",
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* "url":"http:\/\/podunk.edu",
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* "photo":{
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* "mimetype":"image\/jpeg",
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* "src":"http:\/\/podunk.edu\/photo\/profile\/m\/5"
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* },
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* "guid":"kgVFf_...",
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* "guid_sig":"PT9-TAp...",
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* },
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* "author":{
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* "name":"Indigo",
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* "address":"indigo@podunk.edu",
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* "url":"http:\/\/podunk.edu",
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* "photo":{
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* "mimetype":"image\/jpeg",
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* "src":"http:\/\/podunk.edu\/photo\/profile\/m\/5"
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* },
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* "guid":"kgVFf_...",
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* "guid_sig":"PT9-TAp..."
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* }
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* }
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* }
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* }
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* \endcode
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*
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* Currently defined message types are 'activity', 'mail', 'profile', 'location'
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* and 'channel_sync', which each have different content schemas.
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*
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* Ping packet:
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* A ping packet does not require any parameters except the type. It may or may
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* not be encrypted.
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*
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* \code{.json}
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* {
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* "type": "ping"
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* }
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* \endcode
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*
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* On receipt of a ping packet a ping response will be returned:
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*
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* \code{.json}
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* {
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* "success" : 1,
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* "site" {
|
|
* "url": "http:\/\/podunk.edu",
|
|
* "url_sig": "T8Bp7j5...",
|
|
* "sitekey": "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
|
|
* MIICIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQE..."
|
|
* }
|
|
* }
|
|
* \endcode
|
|
*
|
|
* The ping packet can be used to verify that a site has not been re-installed, and to
|
|
* initiate corrective action if it has. The url_sig is signed with the site private key
|
|
* and base64url encoded - and this should verify with the enclosed sitekey. Failure to
|
|
* verify indicates the site is corrupt or otherwise unable to communicate using zot.
|
|
* This return packet is not otherwise verified, so should be compared with other
|
|
* results obtained from this site which were verified prior to taking action. For instance
|
|
* if you have one verified result with this signature and key, and other records for this
|
|
* url which have different signatures and keys, it indicates that the site was re-installed
|
|
* and corrective action may commence (remove or mark invalid any entries with different
|
|
* signatures).
|
|
* If you have no records which match this url_sig and key - no corrective action should
|
|
* be taken as this packet may have been returned by an imposter.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param[in,out] App &$a
|
|
*/
|
|
function post_post(&$a) {
|
|
|
|
$encrypted_packet = false;
|
|
$ret = array('success' => false);
|
|
|
|
$data = json_decode($_REQUEST['data'],true);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Many message packets will arrive encrypted. The existence of an 'iv'
|
|
* element tells us we need to unencapsulate the AES-256-CBC content using
|
|
* the site private key.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if($data && array_key_exists('iv',$data)) {
|
|
$encrypted_packet = true;
|
|
$data = crypto_unencapsulate($data,get_config('system','prvkey'));
|
|
logger('mod_zot: decrypt1: ' . $data, LOGGER_DATA);
|
|
$data = json_decode($data,true);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(! $data) {
|
|
|
|
// possible Bleichenbacher's attack, just treat it as a
|
|
// message we have no handler for. It should fail a bit
|
|
// further along with "no hub". Our public key is public
|
|
// knowledge. There's no reason why anybody should get the
|
|
// encryption wrong unless they're fishing or hacking. If
|
|
// they're developing and made a goof, this can be discovered
|
|
// in the logs of the destination site. If they're fishing or
|
|
// hacking, the bottom line is we can't verify their hub.
|
|
// That's all we're going to tell them.
|
|
|
|
$data = array('type' => 'bogus');
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
$msgtype = ((array_key_exists('type',$data)) ? $data['type'] : '');
|
|
|
|
if($msgtype === 'ping') {
|
|
|
|
// Useful to get a health check on a remote site.
|
|
// This will let us know if any important communication details
|
|
// that we may have stored are no longer valid, regardless of xchan details.
|
|
logger('POST: got ping send pong now back: ' . z_root() , LOGGER_DEBUG );
|
|
|
|
$ret['success'] = true;
|
|
$ret['site'] = array();
|
|
$ret['site']['url'] = z_root();
|
|
$ret['site']['url_sig'] = base64url_encode(rsa_sign(z_root(),get_config('system','prvkey')));
|
|
$ret['site']['sitekey'] = get_config('system','pubkey');
|
|
json_return_and_die($ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
if($msgtype === 'pickup') {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The 'pickup' message arrives with a tracking ID which is associated with a particular outq_hash
|
|
* First verify that that the returned signatures verify, then check that we have an outbound queue item
|
|
* with the correct hash.
|
|
* If everything verifies, find any/all outbound messages in the queue for this hubloc and send them back
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if((! $data['secret']) || (! $data['secret_sig'])) {
|
|
$ret['message'] = 'no verification signature';
|
|
logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message'], LOGGER_DEBUG);
|
|
json_return_and_die($ret);
|
|
}
|
|
$r = q("select distinct hubloc_sitekey from hubloc where hubloc_url = '%s' and hubloc_callback = '%s' and hubloc_sitekey != '' group by hubloc_sitekey ",
|
|
dbesc($data['url']),
|
|
dbesc($data['callback'])
|
|
);
|
|
if(! $r) {
|
|
$ret['message'] = 'site not found';
|
|
logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message']);
|
|
json_return_and_die($ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
foreach ($r as $hubsite) {
|
|
|
|
// verify the url_sig
|
|
// If the server was re-installed at some point, there could be multiple hubs with the same url and callback.
|
|
// Only one will have a valid key.
|
|
|
|
$forgery = true;
|
|
$secret_fail = true;
|
|
|
|
$sitekey = $hubsite['hubloc_sitekey'];
|
|
|
|
logger('mod_zot: Checking sitekey: ' . $sitekey, LOGGER_DATA);
|
|
|
|
if(rsa_verify($data['callback'],base64url_decode($data['callback_sig']),$sitekey)) {
|
|
$forgery = false;
|
|
}
|
|
if(rsa_verify($data['secret'],base64url_decode($data['secret_sig']),$sitekey)) {
|
|
$secret_fail = false;
|
|
}
|
|
if((! $forgery) && (! $secret_fail))
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if($forgery) {
|
|
$ret['message'] = 'possible site forgery';
|
|
logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message']);
|
|
json_return_and_die($ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if($secret_fail) {
|
|
$ret['message'] = 'secret validation failed';
|
|
logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message']);
|
|
json_return_and_die($ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we made it to here, the signatures verify, but we still don't know if the tracking ID is valid.
|
|
* It wouldn't be an error if the tracking ID isn't found, because we may have sent this particular
|
|
* queue item with another pickup (after the tracking ID for the other pickup was verified).
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
$r = q("select outq_posturl from outq where outq_hash = '%s' and outq_posturl = '%s' limit 1",
|
|
dbesc($data['secret']),
|
|
dbesc($data['callback'])
|
|
);
|
|
if(! $r) {
|
|
$ret['message'] = 'nothing to pick up';
|
|
logger('mod_zot: pickup: ' . $ret['message']);
|
|
json_return_and_die($ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Everything is good if we made it here, so find all messages that are going to this location
|
|
* and send them all.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
$r = q("select * from outq where outq_posturl = '%s'",
|
|
dbesc($data['callback'])
|
|
);
|
|
if($r) {
|
|
logger('mod_zot: successful pickup message received from ' . $data['callback'] . ' ' . count($r) . ' message(s) picked up', LOGGER_DEBUG);
|
|
|
|
$ret['success'] = true;
|
|
$ret['pickup'] = array();
|
|
foreach($r as $rr) {
|
|
if($rr['outq_msg']) {
|
|
$x = json_decode($rr['outq_msg'],true);
|
|
|
|
if(! $x)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if(array_key_exists('message_list',$x)) {
|
|
foreach($x['message_list'] as $xx) {
|
|
$ret['pickup'][] = array('notify' => json_decode($rr['outq_notify'],true),'message' => $xx);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
$ret['pickup'][] = array('notify' => json_decode($rr['outq_notify'],true),'message' => $x);
|
|
|
|
$x = q("delete from outq where outq_hash = '%s'",
|
|
dbesc($rr['outq_hash'])
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
$encrypted = crypto_encapsulate(json_encode($ret),$sitekey);
|
|
json_return_and_die($encrypted);
|
|
|
|
/* pickup: end */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* All other message types require us to verify the sender. This is a generic check, so we
|
|
* will do it once here and bail if anything goes wrong.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (array_key_exists('sender',$data)) {
|
|
$sender = $data['sender'];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check if the sender is already verified here */
|
|
|
|
$hub = zot_gethub($sender);
|
|
|
|
if (! $hub) {
|
|
|
|
/* Have never seen this guid or this guid coming from this location. Check it and register it. */
|
|
|
|
// (!!) this will validate the sender
|
|
$result = zot_register_hub($sender);
|
|
|
|
if ((! $result['success']) || (! ($hub = zot_gethub($sender)))) {
|
|
$ret['message'] = 'Hub not available.';
|
|
logger('mod_zot: no hub');
|
|
json_return_and_die($ret);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Update our DB to show when we last communicated successfully with this hub
|
|
// This will allow us to prune dead hubs from using up resources
|
|
|
|
$r = q("update hubloc set hubloc_connected = '%s' where hubloc_id = %d",
|
|
dbesc(datetime_convert()),
|
|
intval($hub['hubloc_id'])
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// a dead hub came back to life - reset any tombstones we might have
|
|
|
|
if ($hub['hubloc_status'] & HUBLOC_OFFLINE) {
|
|
q("update hubloc set hubloc_status = (hubloc_status & ~%d) where hubloc_id = %d",
|
|
intval(HUBLOC_OFFLINE),
|
|
intval($hub['hubloc_id'])
|
|
);
|
|
if ($r[0]['hubloc_flags'] & HUBLOC_FLAGS_ORPHANCHECK) {
|
|
q("update hubloc set hubloc_flags = (hubloc_flags & ~%d) where hubloc_id = %d",
|
|
intval(HUBLOC_FLAGS_ORPHANCHECK),
|
|
intval($hub['hubloc_id'])
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
q("update xchan set xchan_flags = (xchan_flags & ~%d) where (xchan_flags & %d)>0 and xchan_hash = '%s'",
|
|
intval(XCHAN_FLAGS_ORPHAN),
|
|
intval(XCHAN_FLAGS_ORPHAN),
|
|
dbesc($hub['hubloc_hash'])
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This hub has now been proven to be valid.
|
|
* Any hub with the same URL and a different sitekey cannot be valid.
|
|
* Get rid of them (mark them deleted). There's a good chance they were re-installs.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
q("update hubloc set hubloc_flags = ( hubloc_flags | %d ) where hubloc_url = '%s' and hubloc_sitekey != '%s' ",
|
|
intval(HUBLOC_FLAGS_DELETED),
|
|
dbesc($hub['hubloc_url']),
|
|
dbesc($hub['hubloc_sitekey'])
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
/** @TODO check which hub is primary and take action if mismatched */
|
|
|
|
if (array_key_exists('recipients', $data))
|
|
$recipients = $data['recipients'];
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ($msgtype === 'auth_check') {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Requestor visits /magic/?dest=somewhere on their own site with a browser
|
|
* magic redirects them to $destsite/post [with auth args....]
|
|
* $destsite sends an auth_check packet to originator site
|
|
* The auth_check packet is handled here by the originator's site
|
|
* - the browser session is still waiting
|
|
* inside $destsite/post for everything to verify
|
|
* If everything checks out we'll return a token to $destsite
|
|
* and then $destsite will verify the token, authenticate the browser
|
|
* session and then redirect to the original destination.
|
|
* If authentication fails, the redirection to the original destination
|
|
* will still take place but without authentication.
|
|
*/
|
|
logger('mod_zot: auth_check', LOGGER_DEBUG);
|
|
|
|
if (! $encrypted_packet) {
|
|
logger('mod_zot: auth_check packet was not encrypted.');
|
|
$ret['message'] .= 'no packet encryption' . EOL;
|
|
json_return_and_die($ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
$arr = $data['sender'];
|
|
$sender_hash = make_xchan_hash($arr['guid'],$arr['guid_sig']);
|
|
|
|
// garbage collect any old unused notifications
|
|
|
|
// This was and should be 10 minutes but my hosting provider has time lag between the DB and
|
|
// the web server. We should probably convert this to webserver time rather than DB time so
|
|
// that the different clocks won't affect it and allow us to keep the time short.
|
|
|
|
q("delete from verify where type = 'auth' and created < %s - INTERVAL %s",
|
|
db_utcnow(), db_quoteinterval('30 MINUTE')
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
$y = q("select xchan_pubkey from xchan where xchan_hash = '%s' limit 1",
|
|
dbesc($sender_hash)
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// We created a unique hash in mod/magic.php when we invoked remote auth, and stored it in
|
|
// the verify table. It is now coming back to us as 'secret' and is signed by a channel at the other end.
|
|
// First verify their signature. We will have obtained a zot-info packet from them as part of the sender
|
|
// verification.
|
|
|
|
if ((! $y) || (! rsa_verify($data['secret'], base64url_decode($data['secret_sig']),$y[0]['xchan_pubkey']))) {
|
|
logger('mod_zot: auth_check: sender not found or secret_sig invalid.');
|
|
$ret['message'] .= 'sender not found or sig invalid ' . print_r($y,true) . EOL;
|
|
json_return_and_die($ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// There should be exactly one recipient, the original auth requestor
|
|
|
|
$ret['message'] .= 'recipients ' . print_r($recipients,true) . EOL;
|
|
|
|
if ($data['recipients']) {
|
|
|
|
$arr = $data['recipients'][0];
|
|
$recip_hash = make_xchan_hash($arr['guid'], $arr['guid_sig']);
|
|
$c = q("select channel_id, channel_account_id, channel_prvkey from channel where channel_hash = '%s' limit 1",
|
|
dbesc($recip_hash)
|
|
);
|
|
if (! $c) {
|
|
logger('mod_zot: auth_check: recipient channel not found.');
|
|
$ret['message'] .= 'recipient not found.' . EOL;
|
|
json_return_and_die($ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
$confirm = base64url_encode(rsa_sign($data['secret'] . $recip_hash,$c[0]['channel_prvkey']));
|
|
|
|
// This additionally checks for forged sites since we already stored the expected result in meta
|
|
// and we've already verified that this is them via zot_gethub() and that their key signed our token
|
|
|
|
$z = q("select id from verify where channel = %d and type = 'auth' and token = '%s' and meta = '%s' limit 1",
|
|
intval($c[0]['channel_id']),
|
|
dbesc($data['secret']),
|
|
dbesc($data['sender']['url'])
|
|
);
|
|
if (! $z) {
|
|
logger('mod_zot: auth_check: verification key not found.');
|
|
$ret['message'] .= 'verification key not found' . EOL;
|
|
json_return_and_die($ret);
|
|
}
|
|
$r = q("delete from verify where id = %d",
|
|
intval($z[0]['id'])
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
$u = q("select account_service_class from account where account_id = %d limit 1",
|
|
intval($c[0]['channel_account_id'])
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
logger('mod_zot: auth_check: success', LOGGER_DEBUG);
|
|
$ret['success'] = true;
|
|
$ret['confirm'] = $confirm;
|
|
if ($u && $u[0]['account_service_class'])
|
|
$ret['service_class'] = $u[0]['account_service_class'];
|
|
|
|
// Set "do not track" flag if this site or this channel's profile is restricted
|
|
// in some way
|
|
|
|
if (intval(get_config('system','block_public')))
|
|
$ret['DNT'] = true;
|
|
if (! perm_is_allowed($c[0]['channel_id'],'','view_profile'))
|
|
$ret['DNT'] = true;
|
|
if (get_pconfig($c[0]['channel_id'],'system','do_not_track'))
|
|
$ret['DNT'] = true;
|
|
if (get_pconfig($c[0]['channel_id'],'system','hide_online_status'))
|
|
$ret['DNT'] = true;
|
|
|
|
json_return_and_die($ret);
|
|
}
|
|
json_return_and_die($ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ($msgtype === 'request') {
|
|
// request a particular post/conversation by message_id
|
|
$x = zot_process_message_request($data);
|
|
json_return_and_die($x);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ($msgtype === 'purge') {
|
|
if ($recipients) {
|
|
// basically this means "unfriend"
|
|
foreach ($recipients as $recip) {
|
|
$r = q("select channel.*,xchan.* from channel
|
|
left join xchan on channel_hash = xchan_hash
|
|
where channel_guid = '%s' and channel_guid_sig = '%s' limit 1",
|
|
dbesc($recip['guid']),
|
|
dbesc($recip['guid_sig'])
|
|
);
|
|
if ($r) {
|
|
$r = q("select abook_id from abook where uid = %d and abook_xchan = '%s' limit 1",
|
|
intval($r[0]['channel_id']),
|
|
dbesc(make_xchan_hash($sender['guid'],$sender['guid_sig']))
|
|
);
|
|
if ($r) {
|
|
contact_remove($r[0]['channel_id'],$r[0]['abook_id']);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Unfriend everybody - basically this means the channel has committed suicide
|
|
$arr = $data['sender'];
|
|
$sender_hash = make_xchan_hash($arr['guid'],$arr['guid_sig']);
|
|
|
|
require_once('include/Contact.php');
|
|
remove_all_xchan_resources($sender_hash);
|
|
|
|
$ret['success'] = true;
|
|
json_return_and_die($ret);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (($msgtype === 'refresh') || ($msgtype === 'force_refresh')) {
|
|
|
|
// remote channel info (such as permissions or photo or something)
|
|
// has been updated. Grab a fresh copy and sync it.
|
|
// The difference between refresh and force_refresh is that
|
|
// force_refresh unconditionally creates a directory update record,
|
|
// even if no changes were detected upon processing.
|
|
|
|
if ($recipients) {
|
|
|
|
// This would be a permissions update, typically for one connection
|
|
|
|
foreach ($recipients as $recip) {
|
|
$r = q("select channel.*,xchan.* from channel
|
|
left join xchan on channel_hash = xchan_hash
|
|
where channel_guid = '%s' and channel_guid_sig = '%s' limit 1",
|
|
dbesc($recip['guid']),
|
|
dbesc($recip['guid_sig'])
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
$x = zot_refresh(array(
|
|
'xchan_guid' => $sender['guid'],
|
|
'xchan_guid_sig' => $sender['guid_sig'],
|
|
'hubloc_url' => $sender['url']
|
|
), $r[0], (($msgtype === 'force_refresh') ? true : false));
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
// system wide refresh
|
|
|
|
$x = zot_refresh(array(
|
|
'xchan_guid' => $sender['guid'],
|
|
'xchan_guid_sig' => $sender['guid_sig'],
|
|
'hubloc_url' => $sender['url']
|
|
), null, (($msgtype === 'force_refresh') ? true : false));
|
|
}
|
|
$ret['success'] = true;
|
|
json_return_and_die($ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ($msgtype === 'notify') {
|
|
|
|
logger('notify received from ' . $hub['hubloc_url']);
|
|
|
|
|
|
$async = get_config('system','queued_fetch');
|
|
|
|
if ($async) {
|
|
// add to receive queue
|
|
// qreceive_add($data);
|
|
} else {
|
|
$x = zot_fetch($data);
|
|
$ret['delivery_report'] = $x;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
$ret['success'] = true;
|
|
json_return_and_die($ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// catchall
|
|
json_return_and_die($ret);
|
|
}
|